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abstract:  
Demographies of organizations apply demographic methods to study change in populations 
of organizations. There are (at least) five relatively independent demographies of 
organizations. All of these have to deal with the same conceptual and theoretical problems 
that are mainly the result of the biological analogies on which they are based. All of these 
demographies lack a clear and consistent conceptual framework. Such a framework could 
not only help solve these conceptual problems, but would also improve the possibility of 
knowledge exchange between the different fields. Ontology is – among others – the 
scientific field that specifies such conceptual frameworks. Besides introducing and 
explaining this type of ontology, this paper proposes an ontology of events in the 
demographies of organizations. Eight basic types of vital events can be distinguished and 
are defined by means of symbolic logic and set theory: founding, termination, split-off, 
take-over, split-up, merger, essential change, and population transfer. All other types of 
events are either supertypes or are non-vital events. Non-vital events can be transformed 
into population transfer events. All demographies of organizations share these events, this 
ontology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last three decades, demographic methods and concepts have been 
increasingly applied to institutional rather than biological entities. Concepts and 
methods once developed and utilized to describe and analyze changes in human 
populations are now also used to analyze changes in populations of organizations. 
Moreover, this development has taken place in not just one single scientific field, 
but – relatively independently – in at least five. Four of these deal with 
organizations such as firms, associations and unions. The fifth studies households 
and families, which can be regarded as organizations as well (e.g. Khalil 1995).  
These five different demographies of organizations not only originated in 
different scientific fields, but also in different geographical locations: 
1) the demography of organizations in American economic and organizational 
sociology (Hannan & Freeman 1977; 1989; Carroll & Hannan 2000); 
2) the démographie des enterprises in French economic and business history 
(AFHE 1983; Jobert & Chevailler 1986; Jobert & Moss 1990; Jequier 1995); 
3) the demography of firms in European (originally mainly Dutch) business 
statistics (Willeboordse 1986; Struijs & Willeboordse 1990; Kloek 1994); 
4) the demography of firms in Dutch economic geography (van Wissen & 
Gordijn 1992; van Dijk & Pellenbarg (eds.) 1999b; van Wissen 2002); 
5) the demography of households and families in (human) demography (Glick 
1959; Wargon 1974; Burch 1979; Bongaarts, Burch & Wachter (eds.) 1987). 
What all of these approached have in common is that they – to a certain extent – 
are based on biological analogies. They all apply tools, concepts and/or theories 
based on biological entities to institutional entities. However, ‘a firm is a 
socioeconomic organization, to which biological laws do not apply’ (van Wissen 
1997, p. 222).  
The same is true for any other type of organization. With respect to organizational 
ecology, Young wrote that: 
 
definitions are vague and difficult or else entirely lacking.  (…) One must conclude 
that the concepts of biological ecology do not lend themselves readily to 
organizations. (…) These concepts have to be stretched beyond recognition to fit 
organizational phenomena. (Young 1988, p. 21) 
 
Consequently, in all of these fields similar methodological and conceptual 
problems arose (e.g. Carroll & Hannan 2000; Jequier 1995; Willeboordse 1986; 
ON THE ONTOLOGY OF EVENTS IN DEMOGRAPHIES OF ORGANIZATIONS 
Lajos L. Brons 3 
van Dijk & Pellenbarg 1999a; Bongaarts 1983). Most of these problems seem to be 
effects of the application of biological concepts and are, therefore, of a conceptual 
nature. For example, in human demography, there are only two ways of entering a 
population: birth and immigration. Similarly, there are also only two possible exits: 
death and emigration. However, firms, households and other organizations can be 
newly founded, split of a pre-existing organization, result from a merger, etc. 
Hence, there is no single, uniform equivalent of birth in institutional populations. 
Neither is there a single, uniform equivalent of death. 
If the concepts of ‘birth’ and ‘death’ cannot be applied to firms or other 
organizations, the corresponding demographic rates , ‘birth rates’ and ‘death rates’, 
cannot be measured. Therefore, the demographies of organizations need other 
concepts, other events and other measures (rates). However, thus far it seems that 
most demographies of organizations still lack a coherent conceptual framework 
(e.g. Bongaarts 1983; Willeboordse 1986; van Wissen 2002).  
The field that studies and specifies conceptual frameworks is ontology (or at 
least a specific form thereof). ‘An ontology is an explicit specification of a 
conceptualization’ (Gruber 1993, p. 200 – my italics). Ontologies specify the basic 
building blocks of theories, but also the categories of measurement. While 
epistemology provides the foundations for theory testing, ontology provides the 
foundations for theory building and for measurement. Ontologies, however, may 
serve further purposes. Shared ontologies allow communication  and knowledge 
exchange between scientific disciplines or theories, and a shared ontology of 
demographic events (and entities) is a requirement for the use of computers and the 
internet in the education of demographies (Devedžić & Devedžić 2002). 
To facilitate (improved) communication between the different demographies 
of organizations an ontology is needed that specifies the basic conceptual 
framework (or part thereof) of all of these without enforcing the theoretical insights 
of any one of them. Hence, while the ontology specifies the building blocks of 
theory, these building blocks have to be theoretically neutral themselves. 
Moreover, the building blocks have to be usable in theory building and as units of 
measurements (or have to be easily adaptable to these purposes).  
The goal of this paper is to specify part of this shared conceptual framework 
of the demographies of firms. This part is the ontology of events. Such an ontology 
specifies all possible events in a theoretically neutral (or at least as neutral as 
possible) fashion. Before this ontology is specified, the following two sections 
more extensively explain the nature and problems of the demographies of 
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organizations and the merits and methods of ontology and the related tool of 
conceptual analysis in social science. 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHIES OF ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Demographies of organizations apply demographic methods to the study of 
organizations and organizational behavior. The central feature of these approaches 
is their focus on the level of the population rather than on the individual 
organization. Within the set of demographies of organizations, the demography of 
households and families holds a special position. It studies a very specific subject 
that is not studied in any of the other demographies. The other four all deal with 
more or less the same subjects: firms, associations, unions and the like. 
Demographies of organizations have been developed in different fields and 
with different labels. Of course some of these labels, such as the ‘demography of 
households and families’, point at very specific subjects, but the following are all 
labels for demographies of more or less the same subjects: ‘demography of 
organizations’ (Hannan & Freeman 1989); ‘demography of enterprises’ (AFHE 
1983; Kloek 1994); ‘corporate demography’ (Carroll & Hannan 2000); 
‘demography of corporations and industries’ (Carroll & Hannan 2000); ‘industrial 
demography’ (van Wissen 2000); ‘economic demography’ (van Dijk & Pellenbarg 
2000; van Wissen 2000); ‘demography of firms’ (Willeboordse 1986; van Dijk & 
Pellenbarg (eds.) 1999b); ‘firm demography’ (van Dijk & Pellenbarg 2000); 
‘demography of the firm’ (van Wissen 2000); and finally, the awful ‘firmography’ 
(van Dijk & Pellenbarg 2000). 
 
The modern demography of organizations was probably introduced by 
Stinchcombe (1965) as the study of (mainly) ‘births’ and ‘deaths’ of organizations, 
although he later used the term to refer to the human demography of the people in 
an organization (which is now often labeled ‘organizational demography’) 
(Stinchcombe, McDill & Walker 1968). The demography of households and 
families, however, is at least a decade older (e.g. Glick 1959) and Carroll and 
Hannan (2000, ch. 3) describe some earlier forms of what they call ‘corporate 
demography’. 
Hannan and Freeman (1977; 1989) incorporated the demography of 
organizations into organizational ecology, a theory and field within organizational 
and economic sociology that applies ecological concepts and theories to 
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populations of organizations. While organizational ecology is very rich in theory, 
most other demographies of organizations are extremely poor in this respect. The 
demography of firms or enterprises in business statistics, (Dutch) economic 
geography and (French) economic history is mostly (but not exclusively) limited to 
the description of population change. While organizational ecology is a theory of 
organizational behavior based on a biological (i.e. ecological) analogy, these 
demographies of firms are primarily strategies for empirical research. Of course, a 
demography of firms may be used as a strategy to test the theories of organizational 
ecology and organizational ecology may influence actual research questions in the 
demography of firms, but these connections only reinforce the distinction between 
theory and research strategy (or instrument). However, to make such a ‘division of 
labor’ or any other knowledge exchange between these different fields possible, a 
shared ontology is needed. 
As a research strategy, a demography of firms may be useful in economic 
and organizational sociology (i.e. organizational ecology), but also in economic 
geography and economics itself. A demography of firms is a two-step strategy of 
(1) calculating measures of population change and (2) trying to explain these by or 
use these as an explanation for other phenomena. For example, numerous studies 
have been published on the relation between ‘firm birth’ and employment growth 
(e.g. Birch 1979; Reynolds 1987; Barnes & Haskel 2002; van Stel & Storey 2002). 
Some of these studies find positive correlations while others find no relationship at 
all. Interestingly, Heshmati (2001) showed that the effects found in empirical 
studies on the relationships between growth, size and age of firms are dependent 
mainly on the research methods and definitions chosen (see also Brons 2005). 
Rightly, Willeboordse (1986) claimed that a meaningful demography of firms 
demands clear definitions of the concept of the firm and the events (or ‘changes’ as 
he calls them) firms may experience. 
 
Of the different demographies of organizations, the demography of households and 
families was probably the first to explicitly discuss its conceptual foundations. In 
the 1980s the methodological debate in this field focused on the question whether 
its analyses should be based on households or families, or the individuals within 
those households or families. Some demographers (e.g. Glick, 1959; Burch, 1979; 
Murphy, 1996) insisted that family demography should use the family as its basic 
unit of analysis. But others argued that ‘demography is not well equipped to study 
households or any other group of persons which forms a unit either biologically, 
socially, or economically and which therefore should be treated as a unit. The unit 
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of analysis in demography has traditionally been the individual’ (Willekens 1988, 
p.87) and that ‘families and households are slippery little devils; they can divide 
and merge, and there is no way to tell when one family ceases and the next begins’ 
(Ruggles 1990, p. 23). 
Rather than discussing the ontological foundations of the field, most family 
demographers chose to adopt another perspective. Households and families were 
regarded as properties of single individual members: the heads of households (e.g. 
Brass 1983; Willekens 1988; Keilman & Keyfitz 1988). This solution (if it is one) 
was not only defended as an escape from insurmountable methodological problems 
but also with the argument that it ultimately is the individual which should be of 
interest (e.g. Ruggles 1987; Keilman 1988). This latter argument, however, does 
not make much sense since it is households the field is interested in, not heads of 
households. Nevertheless, the approach chosen does work in the demography of 
households and families. Theoretically it is of course incorrect to replace 
households by heads of households (with the households as their properties) in the 
analysis, but in practice there is little difference. The same approach, however, 
would not work in the demography of firms. An approach that regards a 
multinational corporation (or even most smaller firms) as a property of its CEO is 
obviously absurd. (Moreover, such an approach would probably not be acceptable 
to more theoretically informed branches of the demographies of organizations such 
as organizational ecology.) 
 
The main task of the demographies of organizations is to study vital rates of 
organizational events (e.g. Hannan & Freeman 1989). Rates are the most basic 
tools or measurements of demography. A rate is the number of entities that 
experienced a certain event in a certain period, divided by the total population that 
could have experienced that event in that period (e.g. Palmore & Gardner 1983). In 
other words: a rate is events (or occurrences) divided by population at risk. 
However, in demographies of organizations, there are a large number of ill-defined 
events with very unclear and sometimes extremely heterogeneous populations at 
risk. This seriously hampers measurement of the corresponding rates in 
demographies of organizations. 
Organizational ‘birth’ may serve as an example. As events in human 
demography and demography of organizations are not completely identical, it is 
not clear at all what ‘firm birth’ means exactly and how to measure a ‘birth rate' of 
firms. The choice at which point something is considered to be a new firm and, 
hence, it is ‘born’ is not an inconsequential one (Hannan & Freeman 1989; 
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Baldwin et al. 2002). The later the demarcation point of birth in the founding 
process of new firms, the lower the resulting ‘birth rate' (and the higher the ‘life 
expectancy’). Secondly, it is not immediately clear which types of entry should be 
considered a ‘firm birth’ and how to classify the other types of entry events. And 
thirdly, the problem is further complicated by the fact that new firms may have 
both institutional and human founders. This fuelled a discussion on whether the 
population at risk in birth rates of firms should be defined as the total labor supply 
(labor market approach) or as the pre-existing population of firms (organizational 
approach) (e.g. Keeble et al. 1993; van Dijk & Pellenbarg 1999a; van Wissen 
2000). 
These theoretical problems may have serious empirical repercussions, which 
is illustrated easily by comparing the ‘birth rates’ measured by the two approaches 
mentioned above for 531 (of 572) Dutch municipalities in 1997 (the 41 missing 
cases are mostly very small rural municipalities) (data sources: CBS/VKK 1999; 
CBS 2001). The two measurements prove to be dramatically dissimilar. In fact, the 
(Pearson) correlation between the two ‘birth rates’ is as low as 0.262. 
An obvious solution to this problem is to discard the biological analogy, to 
discard the concept of ‘birth’ and to replace is by a set of appropriate concepts 
describing the possible entry events in demographies of organizations. The 
ontology of events specified in this paper offers such a set of concepts (and their 
definitions) and similarly specifies exit and other events. Before we turn to the 
ontology of events, it might be useful to more extensively explain the use of 
ontology and conceptual analysis in social science first. 
 
 
ONTOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
Like all human behavior, science is a linguistic effort. Without language there 
would be no science. Language provides the building blocks for science. Concepts 
and grammar (semantics and syntax) are the bricks and mortar of language. 
Sometimes, however, these bricks seem to be made out of jelly. Conceptual 
analysis is the elucidation of vague, but often very common, concepts. Famous 
early predecessors of conceptual analysis, Socrates and Plato, for example, 
discussed (mainly) ethical concepts, such as ‘goodness’, in an attempt to find 
objective descriptions or definitions of these concepts. (For an extensive review of 
the history of and literature on conceptual analysis see Brons 2005, ch. 2.) 
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Conceptual clarity is necessary to enable reasonable communication within 
(social) science: ‘A good word is like a good tree whose root is firm, (…) it gives 
its fruit at every season’ (Quran 14:24). The ‘bad trees’, on the other hand, are the 
all too ambiguous concepts that cause misunderstanding and ambiguity in science 
and philosophy. Wittgenstein argued, for example, that (a lot of) philosophical 
problems originate from erroneous use of language: ‘Denn die philosophischen 
Probleme entstehen, wenn die Sprache feiert’ (For philosophical problems arise 
when language goes on holiday.) (Wittgenstein 1971 [1953], § 38). The same is (to 
a large extent) true in (social) science (e.g. Winch 1958; Koepsell 1999; Brons 
2005). 
Although ontology is traditionally regarded as part of metaphysics and 
dealing with ‘existence', it is also the philosophical and scientific field that deals 
with conceptual frameworks, rather than single, isolated concepts as in conceptual 
analysis. Nevertheless, there are strong links between ontology, even in this 
‘modern’ sense, and traditional metaphysics. Metaphysics is often interpreted as 
the study or philosophical theory of what is beyond nature and experience, of some 
more fundamental structure of reality. Although the term ‘metaphysics’ became 
deeply embedded in philosophical terminology, it, however, hardly has a fixed 
meaning. Bunge (1977), for example, distinguishes ten different interpretations, 
while he suggests himself that ‘metaphysics is general cosmology or general 
science: it is the science concerned with the whole of reality’ (p. 5). All scientific 
effort is ultimately grounded in some metaphysical theory (e.g. Russel 1948; 
Lakatos 1969; Harvey 1969). Metaphysics as the study of this ‘ultimate reality’, 
however, is not what concerns us here. What does concern us is the fact that 
‘metaphysics can dig up, clarify, and systematize some basic concepts and 
principles occurring in the course of scientific research and even in scientific 
theories’ (Bunge 1977, p. 23).  
In the early 18th century Wolff proposed to divide metaphysics in four parts 
one of which was ontology, which he defined as the study or theory of being or 
existence. Traditionally, this philosophical or existential ontology was the study 
asking ‘What things exist?’ In recent decades, however, the concept of ‘ontology’ 
was associated with new fields and new questions.  
1) The key question in ontology in artificial intelligence and knowledge 
representation is: ‘What things should we represent?’ This is the field of 
representational ontology (e.g. Uschold et al. 1997).  
2) According to Koepsell (1999) ‘many real world problems do result from 
unclear ontologies’ and the goal of applied ontology is to remedy this ‘by 
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careful study of the categories of the social world’ (p. 220). Applied 
ontology is often intended to specify the conceptual framework or language 
of a specific scientific field (e.g. Smith & Mark 1999). In practice, 
representational ontology and applied ontology are closely related, the main 
difference being that representational ontology is normative, while applied 
ontology is descriptive. 
3) Applied ontology is (also) closely related to scientific ontology, although 
there are some differences. Scientific ontology is more explicitly 
philosophical and more similar to traditional existential ontology than 
applied ontology. ‘The analysis we expect from scientific ontology concerns, 
in particular but not exclusively, the ontological categories and hypotheses 
that occur, either in a heuristic or in a constitutive capacity, in scientific 
research’ (Bunge 1977, p. 10). 
4) Social ontology studies what ultimately makes up social reality (e.g. Searle; 
1995; Weissman 2000). As such it seems to be a special type of existential 
ontology. However, social ontology could also be interpreted as the ontology 
of the social sciences. Hence, like scientific ontology, social ontology is a 
mix of existential ontology and applied ontology. 
5) Formal ontology, finally, is the study of formal categories such as parts and 
wholes, introduced by Husserl (1900-1) (e.g. Smith & Künne (eds.) 1982; 
Smith & Mulligan 1983; Smith 1996). Formal ontology has to be 
distinguished from formalization in ontology, which is increasingly applied 
in all of these fields.  
Besides these fields that are explicitly labeled ‘ontology’ there is another that has a 
similar goal, but with a much more pragmatic perspective. Statistical classification 
is the study and definition of the basic units of measurement in some (social) 
system. In practice statistical classification is nearly identical to applied ontology, 
although it generally prefers measurability to theoretical correctness. As will be 
shown below, most of the research on the ontology of the demographies of 
organizations is actually statistical classification. 
 
The concept of ‘ontology’ does not only refer to scientific or philosophical fields or 
theories but also to what these fields study. An ontology is defined by Gruber 
(1993) as a ‘specification of a conceptualisation’ (p. 200). Similarly, Uschold and 
Gruninger (1996) think of an ontology as ‘an explicit account of a shared 
understanding in a given subject area’ (p. 93). An ontology is a specified set of 
concepts, a conceptual structure or framework, a language. An ontology of a 
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scientific field or theory specifies the building blocks of that field or theory, the 
basic ‘things’ (objects, events, properties, etc.), that constitute its (theoretical) 
universe. Hence, an ontology of the demographies of organizations provides a 
complete specification of the conceptual framework of the field. 
Ontologies are structured sets of definitions and like definitions they should 
be non-creative (Leśniewski 1931; Suppes 1957). Ontologies are not intended to 
give new ‘information’ but to (better) structure what is already – although often 
implicitly and unconsciously – known. A ‘good’ ontology is a systematic 
representation of the obvious.  
This does not mean that ontological research is unnecessary. Firstly, 
ontology structures what was unstructured before. Without conceptual analysis, 
concepts are like shapeless chunks of clay. Conceptual analysis transforms these 
into bricks. Ontology adds structure, it builds a wall out of the bricks, a wall that 
should be strong enough to support theoretical and empirical research. Secondly, 
without ontology no data collection is possible. Concepts and ontologies structure 
experience and observation: ‘Abstract concepts are but as flowers gathered, they 
are only moments dipped out from the stream of time, snap-shots taken, as by a 
kineotoscopic camera, at a life that in its original coming is continuous’ (James 
1909, p. 235). Thirdly, ontologies are necessary for (inter-theoretical) 
communication. Without a shared conceptual framework, a shared set of basic 
definitions, in one word: a shared ontology, no knowledge exchange, no synthetic 
theories, no division of labor (see above) is possible. 
 
There is no standard methodology in any of the above mentioned types of ontology 
(e.g. Uschold & Grunninger 1996; Rosenberg 1997 – statistical classification even 
seems to be completely devoid of explicit methodology) and neither is there in 
conceptual analysis, but that does not mean that anything goes. (The most 
influential methodologies of conceptual analysis are probably those forwarded by 
Sartori (1984) and Wilson (1963) (see also Brons 2005, ch. 2), but these are of 
limited relevance in ontology building.) 
The most basic rule in ontology is ‘Ockham’s razor’: Entia non sunt 
multiplicanda praeter necessitatem (entities should not be multiplicated more than 
necessary). (Although attributed to the 14th century philosopher Ockham, it has not 
been found in this form in any of his works.) Ockham’s razor is the methodological 
rule in ontology that one should not assume more entities than necessary and that 
one should prefer the ontology that contains the smallest number of categories or 
types of entities:  
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Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our acceptance of a 
scientific theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we are 
reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of 
raw experience can be fitted and arranged. (Quine 1948, pp. 35-36) 
 
Bunge (1977) proposed ten rules for scientific ontology, which are also relevant in 
applied ontology. However, Bunge's rules seem to be a bit obvious. His most 
important (most relevant) rules are: (1) formalize everything (in logical, set-
theoretical or other mathematical notation); (2) avoid words with an ambiguous 
meaning; (3) be rigorous and exact; (4) use objective terms only; (5) be systematic; 
(6) test for coherence but also for compatibility and contiguity with contemporary 
science. The most important of Bunge's rules may be the first: formalization. Most 
of the others will apply automatically in formal analyses. Much earlier Russell 
asserted that ‘wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for 
inferred entities’ (1914, p. 115). 
Formalization, however, has its limits (we'll come back to that later) and 
there are other ways to be ‘rigorous, exact and systematic’. The most widespread 
method in applied ontology is probably the application of taxonomic structures 
(e.g. Jones & Paton 1999; Welty & Guarino 2001). Taxonomies are tree-shaped 
figures characterized by genus - species relations between the objects on different 
levels. Of all two objects connected by a line, the object on the higher level is the 
genus or supertype and the object on the lower level is the species or subtype. This 
implies, that anything that is true for the species, must be true for the genus; or – in 
other words – the set of objects that satisfy the conditions of the genus must 
contain the (sub-) set of objects that satisfy the conditions of the species. In 
traditional taxonomies (in biology, for example) objects are a species of one and 
only one genus. This, however, is not necessarily the case in ontology (e.g. Sowa 
1995; Uschold & Grunninger 1996; Jones & Paton 1999). There may be more lines 
connecting an object on one level to the objects on a higher level. For example, 
actors in social systems generally have more than one role: a seller is usually also a 
buyer. 
Gruber (1995) suggested a number of further rules or guidelines for 
ontologies that are intended for knowledge sharing. Most important (least 
overlapping with the above) are extensibility, minimal ontological commitment and 
minimal encoding bias. According to the extensibility guideline ontologies should 
be extendible for new (although related) applications. The minimal ontological 
commitment guideline suggests that ‘an ontology should make as few claims as 
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possible about the world being modelled, allowing the parties committed to the 
ontology freedom to specialise and instantiate the ontology as needed’ (Uschold & 
Grunninger 1996, p. 105 – above this was labeled ‘theoretical neutrality’). The 
minimal encoding bias guideline points out that ontologies should not depend on 
the (formal) language chosen. 
The possibly most important (an possibly also the most obvious) 
methodological rule in both ontology and conceptual analysis can be derived from 
Quine's (1968) principle of ontological relativity: 
 
What makes ontological questions meaningless when taken absolutely is not 
universality, but circularity. A question of the form ‘What is an F?’ can be answered 
only by recourse to a further term: ‘An F is a G’. The answer makes only relative 
sense: sense relative to an uncritical acceptance of ‘G’. (p. 204) 
 
Hence in ontological research and/or conceptual analysis more ambiguous terms or 
concepts have to be defined in less ambiguous or preferably even unambiguous 
terms. 
 
As mentioned above, formalization may be a useful tool in ontology building and 
conceptual analysis. Applicable formal methods have been developed in early 20th 
century philosophy and are still being developed in sub-fields of artificial 
intelligence and computer science, such as knowledge engineering and conceptual 
modeling. The most important tools are variants or adaptations of symbolic logic, 
especially first-order logic (FOL), and set-theory (which is basically FOL plus the 
∈-symbol). Mathematical concepts, for example, were analyzed logically by Frege 
(1884) and Whitehead and Russell (1910-3). More recently, symbolic logic has 
been applied in conceptual analysis in formal ontology (see above) (e.g. Smith 
1996). 
Alternative formal languages that can be applied in conceptual analysis and 
ontology include conceptual graphs (Sowa 1984; 1992) and description logic (e.g. 
Brachman & Levesque 1984; Donini et al. 1991). Conceptual graphs were 
originally intended to elucidate conceptual structures, sets of interrelated concepts, 
but can also be used in conceptual analysis. The purpose of conceptual graphs 'is to 
express meaning in a form that is logically precise, humanly readable, and 
computationally tractable' (Sowa 1992, p. 3). 
Since most of these techniques may be translated into first-order logic and 
set-theory (on the relationship between conceptual graphs and first-order logic see 
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e.g. Wermelinger 1995; Amati & Ounis 2000), and these latter formal languages 
are most widespread, it seems most practical to use these as a standard. In some 
cases this standard may have to be extended, however. The formal definition of 
some concepts needs higher order logics or indexing that is not standard in first-
order logic. In first-order logic and set-theory there is a number of possible basic 
structures for definitions of the objects in an ontology (or a single concept in 
conceptual analysis). The most basic is: 
 
∀x [ A(x) ↔ B(x) ] (def. 1) 
 
(for all x, x is an A if and only if it is a B), which defines A as any ‘object’ to 
which condition B applies. Condition B is generally a set of conditions B1(x) ∧ 
B2(x) etc. Hence the basic symbols in formal definitions are the universal quantifier 
∀, and the connectives ∧ (and, conjunction) and ↔ (if and only if, iff, 
biconditional). 
In taxonomic structures the set of conditions B in definition 1 is composed of 
the two subsets that apply to the species only and those that apply to the genus (and 
therefore also to the species). Hence, if a genus G is defined by its property (or set 
thereof) BG: 
 
∀x [ G(x) ↔ BG(x) ]  (def. 2a) 
 
then its species S1 is/are defined by the properties of the genus BG plus the specific 
properties of this/these species BS1: 
 
∀x [ S1(x) ↔ BG(x) ∧ BS1(x) ]  .  (def. 2b) 
 
The species S1, however, may be a genus itself to species S2 further ‘downwards’ 
in the taxonomy: 
 
∀x [ S2(x) ↔ BG(x) ∧ BS1(x) ∧ BS2(x) ]  , (def. 2c) 
 
in which BG and BS1 are the properties that define the genus and BS2 is what is 
specific for the species. For every object on a lower level in the taxonomy, the 
properties of the object on the higher level it is connected to (i.e. is a species of) are 
a subset of its properties and some more specific properties (to define the species) 
are added. 
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Not all concepts can be defined as in definition 1 or 2. Many concepts in 
social science refer to sets of objects rather than to individuals: 
 
A =def { x | B(x) } (def. 3) 
 
(A is the set of all x-s that are B-s). An example of such a definition is this formal 
definition of the concept of ‘culture’ (Anderson & Moore 1963; Brownstein 1995): 
 
‘culture’ =def { α | ∃x,y ◊ [ x learns α from y  ∧  x ≠ y ] }  (def. 4) 
 
(‘culture’ is the set of α-s for which there are an x and a y (that are not the same 
thing) such that it is possible that x learns α from y). 
A further class of ‘objects’ that are generally not easily defined as in 
definition 1 or 2 are events. Events (in general) are usually defined as changes in 
(physical) objects (e.g. Lombard 1986). Hence an event could be defined as: 
 
∀x,t,t' [ ∃e [ A(e,x,t,t') ] ↔ ∃B [ ¬ ( B(x)t ↔ B(x)t' ) ] ] (def. 5) 
 
(for all objects x and points in time t and t' there is an e and e is an event of type A 
(happening to x in period t to t') iff there is some property B such that x was a B at 
either t or t', but not at both). In other words: there is an A-event if there is a change 
in condition B of x. Or alternatively: an A-event is a change in condition B of an x. 
Note that in definition 5 we have left first order logic, which does not allow 
quantification over properties (B).  
 
As mentioned, all formalization has its limits. Although formalization may help in 
systematically structuring an ontology and especially in formalizing taxonomic 
structures, in conceptual analysis its use is limited because of Quine's ontological 
relativity (see above). The utility of formalization in conceptual analysis is 
dependent on the reducibility of the concepts, which are to be analyzed, to more 
basic concepts, which are already defined or are even part of the structure of the 
formal language itself. It is, for example, rather unclear what the advantage is of 
definition 4 in comparison to a similar ordinary language statement. As an 
analytical tool, therefore, formalization is most useful in the analysis of concepts, 
which are reducible to formal categories such as sets and set membership, as is the 
case in, for example, part - whole relationships in formal ontology (e.g. Smith 
1996). 
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If such a reduction is not possible, formalization is less likely to be as 
powerful a tool (in conceptual analysis) as one might wish. The problem is that 
formal languages are rather poor meta-languages (languages used to describe 
concepts in the object-language), while Tarski (1935) proved that to analyze a 
concept satisfactorily (in his case: ‘truth’) the meta-language must be substantially 
richer in expressive power than the object-language. This implies that a full 
conceptual analysis of most social scientific concepts is virtually impossible, since 
there is no expressively ‘richer’ language available than the ordinary language 
these concepts are from, while, on the other hand, ordinary language often lacks the 
rigor needed for sharp description and definition. While this may limit the 
usefulness of formalization in the analysis of isolated concepts (as in conceptual 
analysis), it does, however, not affect ontology. Indeed, formalization does not 
necessarily result in better definitions, but it does generally more explicitly and 
more rigorously structure conceptual systems (by formally specifying taxonomic 
relationships, for example). 
 
 
AN ONTOLOGY OF DEMOGRAPHIC EVENTS 
 
A top-level ontology of demography distinguishes events and objects. Basically, 
demography counts events (‘births’, ‘deaths’, etc.) and objects (people, firms, 
organizations) that (may) experience these events. These are the essential building 
blocks of the demographic universe. However, both events and objects have 
properties, which determine whether events and/or objects should be counted in a 
specific measurement. Event rates are always related to a specific period, hence the 
point in time at which an event came to pass is of prime importance to calculate 
such a measure. Likewise, migration rates demand knowledge about the place of an 
object; and industry specific research, such as in organizational ecology, demands 
knowledge about the industry of an object (firm). All (these) properties are (or can 
be) treated as classes. Periods are temporal classes, regions are spatial classes and 
an industry is a class of similar activities. Temporal classes (periods) are used to 
group events; spatial and industrial classes (regions and industries) delimit (sub-) 
populations and, therefore, spatial and industrial boundary crossings are 
demographic events. 
Most of the ontological research in the demographies of organizations was 
done by statisticians and refers to the objects. Obvious examples are the 
International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC 
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Rev. 3 – UN 1990) and the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the 
European Community (NACE – EC 1990; 2002). Recently Eurostat and among 
others the British and Dutch statistical agencies have been working on a revision of 
NACE, which resulted in the CLAMOUR project and a new model (e.g. van der 
Hoeven et al. 2001). All of these ontologies of objects distinguish ‘things’ like 
legal units, institutional units, kind-of-activity units, local units, local kind-of-
activity units, etc. Besides these statistical approaches to the ontology of 
organizational objects, some ontologies have been build for enterprise modeling in 
computer science and/or related fields (e.g. Uschold et al. 1997). 
Within the field of statistical classification, an ontology of the events in the 
demographies of organizations was proposed by Struijs and Willeboordse (1988; 
1990; 1995), who attempted to formally define these events as relations between 
the number of firms before and after the event accounting for preservation of 
identity. For example, a ‘birth’ is a 0:1 relation in which preservation of identity is 
inapplicable; a split-off is a 1:n relation with preservation of identity; a merger is a 
n:1 without preservation of identity; etc.  
There are, however, two important objections to Struijs and Willeboordse's 
ontology. Firstly, events were defined above as changes in objects. Similarly, 
demographic events are changes in demographic objects. However, demographic 
events are also population changes. Pressat (1979) defines an event as a fact that 
both concerns an individual and directly influences the structure and development 
of (one or more) populations. Hence, demographic events conceptually link 
individual change to population change. The fact that demographic events change 
both individuals and populations is  essential in demography’s population 
perspective. Demography studies population change, not individual change (as 
such) and, hence, definitions of demographic events should link individual change 
to population change. The classification of Struijs and Willeboordse, however, 
describes events as changes in objects only and makes no reference to 
population(s) whatsoever. Consequently, events that imply a population transfer 
(such as migration) do not fit in their system. 
Secondly, Struijs and Willeboordse's ontology may be insufficiently rigorous 
and systematic. For example, the different events are simply listed and no 
taxonomic structure (or any other structure) is (explicitly) revealed. To build a 
stronger foundation for the demographies of organizations and to improve 
knowledge (and data) exchange between its different branches, a more rigorous and 
more explicitly structured ontology of events is needed. An ontology, moreover, 
that is explicitly based on demography’s population perspective. 
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In mathematics, populations are (special kinds of) sets (e.g. James & James 
1992) and some demographers seem to adopt a similar notion. In the original 
French edition of his dictionary of demography, Pressat (1979) defines a 
population as an ‘ensemble d’individus coexistant à un moment donné et délimité 
selon des critères variés d’appartenance' (p. 155). Interestingly, ‘ensemble' and 
‘appartenance' are (a.o.) the French terms for ‘set’ and ‘set membership’ 
respectively. Hence Pressat's definition of ‘population’ may be translated as ‘a set 
of individuals which coexist at a given moment, bounded by criteria depending on 
their set membership.’ However, the corresponding definition in the English 
edition of his dictionary (Pressat 1985) does not include any reference to sets. 
If populations can be (formally) interpreted as sets, demographic events can 
be defined formally as changes in set membership. However, to do so, the notions 
of ‘population’ and ‘changes in set membership’ need some further elucidation. 
The set PA is the population of all individual organizations of type A (definition 6). 
(The concept of ‘type' should not be interpreted in its logical sense here, neither 
does it refer to the notion of ‘form’ (or anything similar) as in Pólos, Hannan & 
Carroll (2002). ‘Type A’ here simply means ‘any predicate or set of predicates, 
labeled ‘A’’.) 
 
PA = { x | A(x) ∧ individual(x) } (def. 6) 
 
(the population PA is the set of all x-s that are A-s and that are individuals). Note 
that definition 6 implies that ∀A[∃PA] and that, hence, the concept of ‘population’ 
does not necessarily refer here to populations in a (organizational) ecological sense, 
but in a abstract demographic or logico-mathematical sense. 
Individuality is defined by Guarino and Welty (2000) as a combination of 
identifiability and unity. As members of PA are already identified – by definition – 
as A-type entities, individuality can – in this case – be equated to unity. Here, unity 
may be defined as not being a part or division (predicated ‘PT') of another, similar, 
entity. Hence definition 6 can be rewritten as: 
 
PA = { x | A(x) ∧ ¬∃y [ A(y) ∧ PT(x,y) ] }   (def. 7) 
 
(the population PA is the set of all x-s that are A-s and for which there are no y-s 
that are also A-s on of which x is a part), in which the part or division of the two-
place predicate PT(x,y) could possibly be rewritten as x⊂y if organizations are 
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defined as sets of roles (or tasks or routines, etc.), but that is a subject for another 
paper. 
 
As mentioned, an event is a change in an object. Hence, in the case of the 
demography of firms, for example, an event may be defined as a change in the 
properties or characteristics of a firm. This could be formalized by stating that there 
is an event if and only if (Φx)t ≠ (Φx)t' in which the set of properties of a firm x is 
symbolized by Φx (Φ from Greek ϕυσις, meaning nature or constitution (of a 
thing)). Defining an event as a state transition (in this way) implies that there has 
been no event if an object (organization) changes and changes back in a period t to 
t' (in which t and t' are two points in time such that t ≠ t'). Although this is 
theoretically incorrect, it is standard practice in demography since data availability 
is usually limited to fixed points in time (generally with a one-year interval). 
However, this implies that the definition is practically correct only if t and t' are 
defined as the points in time at which data was collection and t' is defined as the 
first data collection time-point after t. 
In demography, events are aggregated into rates. Demographic rates are 
defined as the number of occurrences divided by the exposure (of the population at 
risk). As a consequence of the state transition definition of events, the number of 
events of a certain type equals the number of objects for which the conditions at t 
and t' in the definition hold. However, there are some exceptions to this rule in 
cases where more than one object originates from or ends in one event (compare 
the birth of twins in human demography). The population at risk, on the other hand, 
is the number of objects for which the condition at t holds and the condition at t' 
was possible. Hence the rate for event F can be defined – with noted exceptions – 
as: 
 
x)} ,t'(F,     x)  t,(F,  | {x
x)} ,t'(F,    x)  t,(F,  | {x
F conditioncondition
conditioncondition
rate ◊∧
∧=  (def. 8) 
 
(the F-rate is the cardinal number of the set of all x-s to which condition F applied 
at both t and t' divided by the cardinal number of the set of all x-s to which 
condition F applied at t and could possibly have applied at t'). By means of 
definition 8 any definition of an event that specifies the conditions at t and t' (and 
nothing else) can be easily transformed into a definition of its corresponding rate. 
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The most basic distinction in types of demographic events is that between vital and 
non-vital events. Vital events are usually defined as a special class of events 
causing (some kind of) population change (e.g. Pressat 1979). This definition is 
rather ambiguous, because almost any (demographic) event causes some kind of 
change to the exact size or structure of a population. A more precise definition may 
be obtained by recognizing that vital events (predicated ‘V’) are essentially 
changes in population (set) membership: 
 
∀x,t,t' [ ∃1e [ V(e,x,PA,t,t') ] ↔ ¬ ( (x∈PA)t ↔ (x∈PA)t' ) ] (def. 9) 
 
(for all x, t and t', there is one and only one (∃1) vital (V) event e (happening to x in 
population PA in period t to t') iff x was a member of PA at either t or t', but not at 
both). Hence in any vital event at either t or t' but not at both x is not a member of 
PA (x∉PA). The subtypes of vital events (the lower levels in the taxonomy) then are 
specific forms of x∉PA. (Since specific forms of x∈PA – if these exist – do not 
affect the size of PA, these are not relevant in vital events.) One of these specific 
forms of x∉PA is related to the part or division relationship in definitions 7. These 
parts or divisions of organizations cannot be ignored in demographies of 
organizations. Non-individual parts or divisions of organizations (predicated ‘NIP’; 
definition 8) play a crucial role in several events. 
 
∀x,y, [ NIP(x,y,PA) ↔ ( x∉PA ∧ y∈PA ∧ PT(x,y) ) ] (def. 10) 
 
(for all x and y, x is a non-individual part of y which is a member of population PA 
iff x is not a member of PA and y is and x is a part or division of y). Besides ‘NIP’, 
there are two other ways for an organization of not being an element of PA: non-
existence (predicated ‘NEX’; definition 12) or membership of a complementary 
population PB: 
 
∀x [ x∉PA ↔ ( ∃y [ NIP(x,y,PA) ] ∨ NEX(x) ∨  
 ∃PB [ x∈PB ∧ PB∩PA=∅ ] ) ] (def. 11) 
 
(for all x, x is not a member of population PA iff their is an y, x is an non-individual 
part of, or x does not exist, or there is a population PB that does not overlap with PA 
and of which x is a member). 
 
∀x [ NEX(x) ↔ ¬∃PA [ x∈PA ∨ ∃y [ NIP(x,y,PA) ] ] ] (def. 12) 
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(for all x, x does not exist if there is no population PA, x is a member of, or in 
which there is a member y, x is a non-individual part of). 
The subtypes of vital events can be shown by means of a cross-tab based on 
the four different conditions for x, specified in the definitions above: membership 
(x∈PA), non-individuality (∃y[NIP(x,y,PA)]), non-existence (NEX(x)), and 
membership of a complementary population (∃PB[x∈PB∧PB∩PA=∅]). 
 
table 1: a cross-tab of the existential conditions of x at t and t' 
  t' 
 
 x∈PA ∃y[NIP(x,y,PA)] NEX(x) ∃PB[x∈PB∧ 
PB∩PA=∅] 
x∈PA no event exit by 
integration *  
termination emigration 
∃y[NIP(x,y,PA)] entry by 
disintegration ** 
no event non-vital event non-vital event 
NEX(x) 
new founding 
 (in PA) 
non-vital event no event 
new founding 
 (in PB) 
t 
∃PB[x∈PB∧ 
PB∩PA=∅] immigration non-vital event termination no event 
Notes: * take-over or merger; ** split-off or up. 
 
Besides the seven vital events in table 1 (take-over, merger, termination, 
population transfer (migration), split-off, split-up, new founding), there is an 
eighth: (essential) change, which reflects the fact that organizations (contrary to 
biological entities) may change that much that it is better to speak of a new entity. 
All of the events in table and essential change are defined in this paper. 
The vital events mentioned are part of the taxonomic structure presented in 
figure 1. Some events combine entry and exit. Moreover, all events that do no 
imply a strict beginning or end of an organization (e.g. migration vs. new founding) 
may involve more than one population, which somewhat complicates the 
classification (and definition) of events. To avoid this complication the next two 
sections define all types of possible vital events in a single population with the 
restriction that population transfer is impossible. This restriction will be relaxed in 
the section on population transfer and non-vital events. 
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figure 1: a taxonomy of demographic events 
pop.transf. = population transfer. Events are described and defined in following sections. 
 
 
ENTRY AND EXIT 
 
Preston et al. (2001) claim that ‘no matter how a population is defined, there are 
only two ways of entering it: being born into it; or migrating to it' (p. 2). This may 
be true in demographies of biological entities, but in the case of organizations, 
entry is a bit more complicated as will be shown here. Entry (predicated ‘E'), in 
general, is the event in which an object was not a member of a population at the 
beginning of the measurement period and was a member at the end of this period: 
 
∀x,t,t' [ ∃1e [ E(e,x,PA,t,t') ] ↔ ( (x∉PA)t ∧ (x∈PA)t' ) ] (def. 13) 
 
(for all x, t and t', there is one and only one entry (E) event e (happening to x in 
population PA in period t to t') iff x was not a member of PA at t but was at t'). 
According to definition 11 there are three ways of not being a member of PA 
(the condition for t in definition 13): non-individuality (NIP), non-existence (NEX) 
and membership of another (non-overlapping) population. The exclusion of the 
possibility of population transfer in this section, however, limits the possibilities to 
two: disintegration and introduction (the third option will be dealt with in the 
section on population transfer). The essential difference between organizational 
introduction and entry by disintegration (such as split-off or split-up) is that the 
object in question in the case of introduction (predicated ‘EI’; definition 14) did not 
vital event other
entry exit
introduction
change
dissolution
split-off take-over split-up merger
disintegration integration 
event
termination founding 
pop. 
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exist at all at t, while it did exist – albeit only as a part or division (of a member of 
PA) – in the case of entry by disintegration (predicated ‘ED’; definition 15).  
 
∀x,t,t' [ ∃1e [ EI(e,x,PA,t,t') ] ↔ ( NEX(x)t ∧ (x∈PA)t' ) ] (def. 14) 
 
(for all x, t and t', there is one and only one entry by introduction (EI) event e 
(happening to x in population PA in period t to t') iff x did not exist at t but was a 
member of PA at t'). 
 
∀x,t,t' [ ∃1e [ ED(e,x,PA,t,t') ] ↔ ( ( ∃y [ NIP(x,y,PA)] )t ∧ (x∈PA)t' ) ](def. 15) 
 
(for all x, t and t', there is one and only one entry by disintegration (ED) event e 
(happening to x in population PA in period t to t') iff there was a y that was a 
member of PA and of which x was a non-individual part at t and x was a member of 
PA at t'). 
 
As shown in figure 1 above, both introduction and entry by disintegration can be 
further subdivided in a number of events. Introduction events include new 
founding, merger and (essential) change. Entry by disintegration may occur by 
split-off or split-up. Merger, (essential) change and split-up, however, are 
combination events, which also comprise exit events. These are dealt with in the 
following section on combination events, while new founding and split-off are 
defined in this section. 
New founding is the event of a completely new firm establishment. Hence, 
contrary to the other introduction events, no other (organizational!) objects and/or 
events are involved in new founding. Founding (predicated ‘EIF’), therefore, is 
defined as an introduction event involving just one object and just one event: 
 
∀x,t,t' [ ∃1e [ EIF(e,x,PA,t,t') ] ↔ ( NEX(x)t ∧ (x∈PA)t' ∧  
 ¬∃e',y [ V(e',x,PA,t,t') ∧ V(e',y,PA,t,t') ] ) ]  (def. 16) 
 
(for all x, t and t', there is one and only one founding (EIF) event e (happening to x 
in population PA in period t to t') iff x did not exist at t but was a member of PA at t' 
and there was no other event e' and no y such that this other event was a vital event 
happening to both x and y in the same period t to t'). 
The only pure entry by disintegration event is split-off. In a split-off, the 
object in question first exists as a part or division of another entity and then 
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becomes an independent object (firm). In entry by split-off (predicated ‘EDS’), two 
firms are involved (the ‘parent' and the ‘child’) and both are members of PA at t': 
 
∀x,t,t' [ ∃1e [ EDS(e,x,PA,t,t') ] ↔ ∃y [ NIP(x,y,PA)t ∧ 
 (x∈PA ∧ y∈PA)t' ] ]  (def. 17) 
 
(for all x, t and t', there is one and only one entry by split-off (EDS) event e 
(happening to x in population PA in period t to t') iff there was a y that was a 
member of PA and of which x was a non-individual part at t and both x and y were 
members of PA at t'). 
 
Exit events (predicated ‘X’; definition 18) are basically the reverse of entry events 
(definition 13). Definitions for exit events are obtained by replacing the conditions 
for t and t' in the definitions for entry events. 
 
∀x,t,t' [ ∃1e [ X(e,x,PA,t,t') ] ↔ ( (x∈PA)t ∧ (x∉PA)t' ) ]  (def. 18) 
 
(for all x, t and t', there is one and only one exit (X) event e (happening to x in 
population PA in period t to t') iff x was a member of PA at t but was not at t'). 
The dissolution event (predicated ‘XD’; definition 19) is the reverse of 
introduction (definition 14). Integration (predicated ‘XI’; definition 20) is the 
reverse of disintegration (definition 15). Termination (predicated ‘XDT'; definition 
21) is the reverse of new founding (definition 16). And finally, Take-over 
(predicated ‘XIT'; definition 22) is the reverse of split-off (definition 17). 
 
∀x,t,t' [ ∃1e [ XD(e,x,PA,t,t') ] ↔ ( (x∈PA)t ∧ NEX(x)t' ) ]  (def. 19) 
 
(for all x, t and t', there is one and only one exit by dissolution (XD) event e 
(happening to x in population PA in period t to t') iff x was a member of PA at t but 
did not exist at t'). 
 
∀x,t,t' [ ∃1e [ XI(e,x,PA,t,t') ] ↔ ( (x∈PA)t ∧ ( ∃y [ NIP(x,y,PA)] )t' ) ] (def. 20) 
 
(for all x, t and t', there is one and only one exit by integration (XI) event e 
(happening to x in population PA in period t to t') iff x was a member of PA at t and 
there was a y that was a member of PA and of which x was a non-individual part at 
t'). 
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∀x,t,t' [ ∃1e [ XDT(e,x,PA,t,t') ] ↔ ( (x∈PA)t ∧ NEX(x)t' ∧  
 ¬∃1e' ∃y [ V(e',x,PA,t,t') ∧ V(e',y,PA,t,t') ] ) ]  (def. 21) 
 
(for all x, t and t', there is one and only one termination (XDT) event e (happening 
to x in population PA in period t to t') iff x was a member of PA at at t, but did not 
exist at t' and there was no other event e' and no y such that this other event was a 
vital event happening to both x and y in the same period t to t'). 
 
∀x,t,t' [ ∃1e [ XIT(e,x,PA,t,t') ] ↔ ∃y [ (x∈PA ∧ y∈PA)t ∧ 
 NIP(x,y,PA)t' ] ]  (def. 22) 
 
(for all x, t and t', there is one and only one exit by take-over (XIT) event e 
(happening to x in population PA in period t to t') iff there was a y such that both x 
and y were members of PA at t and that y was a member of PA and x was a non-
individual part of y at t'). 
 
 
COMBINATION EVENTS 
 
Combination events combine exit and entry in a single event. Figure 1 presented 
four types of combination events: split-up, merger, (essential) change and 
population transfer. The first of these two are relatively similar to split-off and 
take-over respectively. The third is a little bit more problematic. The fourth implies 
multiple populations and will, therefore, be dealt with in the following section. 
In merger and split-up at least three objects (firms, organizations, etc.) are 
involved. In the case of a split-up, two of these (the new firms) experience entry 
(by disintegration) and the third (the original firm) experiences exit (by 
dissolution). In the case of merger it is the other way around. Definitions 23 and 24 
define split-up and merger respectively. In the case of definition 23, x splits up into 
the set Z; and in the case of definition 24, the members of Z merge into x. 
Definitions 23 and 24 introduce four new predicates: ‘CES’: entry by split-up; 
‘CXS’: exit by split-up; ‘CEM’: entry by merger; and ‘CXM’: exit by merger. 
 
∀x,Z,t,t' [ |Z|>1 → ∀z [ z∈Z → ∃1e [ CES(e,z,PA,t,t') ∧ 
 CXS(e,x,PA,t,t') ] ↔ ( NIP(z,x,PA)t ∧ ( z∈PA ∧ NEX(x) )t' ) ] ] (def. 23) 
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(for all x, Z, t and t', if Z has more than one members (|Z|>1), then for all of these 
members z there is one and only one event e that is an entry by split-up (CES) 
happening to all z (in population PA in period t to t') and an exit by split-up (CXS) 
happening to x (in population PA in period t to t') iff all z were non-individual parts 
of x (which was a member of PA) at t and all z were members of PA while x did not 
exists at t'). 
 
∀x,Z,t,t' [ |Z|>1 → ∀z [ z∈Z → ∃1e [ CEM(e,x,PA,t,t') ∧ 
 CXM(e,z,PA,t,t') ] ↔ ( z∈PA ∧ NEX(x) )t ∧ NIP(z,x,PA)t' ] ] (def. 24) 
 
(for all x, Z, t and t', if Z has more than one members (|Z|>1), then for all of these 
members z there is one and only one event e that is an entry by merger (CEM) 
happening to x (in population PA in period t to t') and an exit by merger (CXS) 
happening to all z (in population PA in period t to t') iff all z were members of PA 
while x did not exists  at t and  
all z were non-individual parts of x (which was a member of PA) at t'). 
 
Essential change is the only vital event that does not affect population size. 
Nevertheless, since it can be regarded as a combination of exit and entry, it is vital 
according to definition 13. It is the event of an object changing (itself) that much 
that it becomes a new object. Remember that events in general are defined as 
changes in the set of the characteristics of objects Φx. The question now is, in what 
cases the change in Φx is so substantial, that the old object (organization) no longer 
exists and a new one is ‘born’. This is the problem of identity over time, which has 
been discussed by numerous philosophers (for an overview see Noonan (ed.) 1993; 
Sider 2000). However, the demographies of organizations are in need of a more 
practical approach. 
The easiest solution is based on Leibniz’ (1953 [1686]) principle of the 
identity of indiscernibles. According to this principle, two objects are the same if 
and only if they share all their properties. This is called ‘strong identity’. 
 
∀x,y,t,t' [ (x)t = (y)t' ↔ (Φx)t = (Φy)t' ] (def. 25) 
 
(for all x, y, t and t', x at t and y at t' are identical (one and the same object) iff the 
sets of properties of x at t and y at t' coincide). This easy way out, however, causes 
a serious problem: it prohibits any change. In other words: according to proposition 
1 any change in the characteristics of an organization will result in its dissolution 
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and the introduction of a new organization, which would rather drastically distort 
introduction and dissolution rates of organizations. The fact is, of course, that 
firms, for example, do change and that we still recognize them as the same firms. 
In the introduction of her famous The theory of the growth of the firm (1959) Edith 
Penrose wrote: 
 
In practice the name of a firm may change, its managing personnel and its owners 
may change, the products it produces may change, its geographical location may 
change, its legal form may change, and still in the ordinary course of events we 
would consider it to be the same firm and could write the story of its ‘life’. (pp. 22) 
 
A more or less contrary position was defended by, for example, Triffin (1956), who 
argued that any change in the production function of a firm, however small, will 
result in a new firm, with new profit opportunities of its own.  
As strong identity (symbolized by =) proves to be too ‘strong’, we need to 
define identity over time as some form of weak identity (symbolized by =w). An 
obvious solution is to propose, that organizational identity is dependent on a subset 
of Φ containing the essential properties or characteristics only: ΦE: 
 
∀x,y,t,t' [ (x)t =w (y)t' ↔ (ΦEx)t = (ΦEy)t' ] (def. 26) 
 
(for all x, y, t and t', x at t and y at t' are weakly identical (one and the same object) 
iff the sets of essential properties of x at t and y at t' coincide). However, this 
implies that we should define a single property or set of properties ΦE, which has to 
stay the same to guarantee identity over time. This might be impossible or 
extremely difficult at least. A more appropriate alternative is available in an 
application of Wittgenstein’s (1971 [1953]) notion of family resemblances. He 
developed this idea trying to explain the meaning of the concept of ‘game’. 
According to Wittgenstein ‘der Begriff ‘Spiel’ ist ein Begriff mit verschommenen 
Rändern’ (the concept of ‘game’ is a concept with blurred edges) (§ 71). Such a 
concept can only be explained by referring to a set of properties of games in 
general and claiming that each specific game has at least some properties, which 
are elements of the before mentioned set of properties of games in general.  
Applying the concept of family resemblance to a definition of identity over 
time based on sets of properties involves comparing the similarities and differences 
of xt and yt'. In definition 27, x (existing at t) and y (existing at t') are one and the 
same object to the extent of i, in which i is the sum of the weights w of the 
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intersection of Φx and Φy divided by the sum of the weights w of the union of Φx 
and Φy, in which w is the weight that is assigned to each type of property (‘type of 
property’ here refers to a class of properties like ‘address’ rather than to a particular 
member of this class, a specific address of an actual organization):  
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 in which ∀wϕ [ 0 < wϕ < 1 ] and ∃wϕ [wϕ > 0 ]  . 
 
Definition 25 results in fuzzy identity over time in which the extent of fuzzy 
identity is determined by i. The larger i, the ‘stronger’ the identity over time. The 
values (for i) of 0 and 1 (whether in a crisp or in a fuzzy version) mean absolutely 
no identity and complete (strong) identity, respectively.  
The fuzzy identity of definition 27 can be converted into a crisp event by 
introducing a threshold. Theoretically, such a threshold would be incorrect of 
course, because every possible cut-off point is disputable, but in practice definition 
27 is used in combination with a threshold in, for example, the Provincial 
Employment Register of the Dutch province of Groningen (PWR Groningen) for 
the identity over time of local establishments of firms. In this data set three (types 
of) properties (name, address, and activity) are assigned the weight (w) 1 and all 
other (types of) properties have weight (w) 0. The threshold is fixed at two-thirds, 
which means that, to stay the same local establishment, only one of three properties 
can change in one year. 
Based on definition 27 the combination event of essential change can be 
defined as two objects having identity over time below the threshold (definition 
28). (Two new predicates are introduced in definition 28: ‘CEC’: entry by 
(essential) change and ‘CXC’: exit by (essential) change.) 
 
∀x,y,t,t' [ ∃1e [ CEC(e,y,PA,t,t') ∧ CXC(e,x,PA,t,t') ] ↔ 
 ( xt ≈i yt' ∧ i<threshold ) ∧ (x∈PA ∧ NEX(y) )t ∧ 
 ( NEX(x) ∧ y∈PA )t'] (def. 28) 
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(for all x, y, t and t', there is one and only one event e that is an entry by essential 
change (CEC) happening to x (in population PA in period t to t') and an exit by 
essential change (CXC) happening to x (in population PA in period t to t') iff x at t 
and y at t' are weakly identical (one and the same object) to the extent i and i is 
smaller than the threshold and x is a member of PA while y does not exist at t and y 
is a member of PA while x does not exist at t'). 
Definition 27 in combination with a threshold can be used in a similar fashion to 
distinguish split-off from split-up and take-over from merger. In split-off and take-
over, one of the participant objects (organizations) persists, has (fuzzy / weak) 
identity over time (i≥threshold). In split-up and merger all identity over time (i) is 
below the threshold. 
 
 
POPULATION TRANSFER AND NON-VITAL EVENTS 
 
Population transfer is the event of a single object leaving one population and 
entering another. An obvious example of this event is migration in which a single 
object leaves one regionally bounded population and enters another regionally 
bounded population. However, population transfer can also be combined with all 
types of vital events involving existence (either PA membership or being a part or 
division of a PA member, NIP) of objects at both t and t'. For example, the event of 
merger (definition 24) may involve population transfer if one of the initial objects z 
that merge into x is from another population.  It is possible to define all possible 
combinations of vital events distinguished in figure 1 with population transfer, but 
this would introduce a number of rather obscure events recognized by hardly 
anyone. Moreover, in practice, this type of combinations does rarely (if ever) occur 
as a single event. Hence, in the case of this type of combination events, it would be 
advisable to treat these as two (or even more) separate events. 
Populations and sub-populations are not necessarily bounded by regions 
(alone). Any property may function as a (sub-) population forming class. 
Populations may be bounded or subdivided by size classes, industries, profitability 
classes, or any other way. This implies that any non-vital event can be transformed 
into a vital event by introducing a further classification. In all of these cases an exit 
out of one population and an entry into another is a population transfer event. 
The population transfer event is defined as a PB membership at t and a PA 
membership at t', providing that PA and PB are non-overlapping populations. 
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Definition 29 introduces two new predicates: ‘TE': entry by population transfer and 
‘TX’: exit by population transfer. 
 
∀x,t,t' [ ∃1e [ TE(e,x,PA,t,t') ∧ TX(e,x,PB,t,t') ] ↔  
 ( PA∩PB=∅ ∧ (x∈PB)t ∧ (x∈PA)t' ) ] (def. 29) 
 
(for all x, t and t', there is one and only one event e that is an entry by migration 
(TE) in population PA (happening to x in period t to t') and an exit by migration 
(TE) in population PB (happening to x in period t to t') iff PA and PB do not overlap 
and x is a member of PB at t and a member of PA at t'). 
 
Non-vital events are all events that do not directly affect population membership 
and do not involve existential change (see def. 13). This includes organizational 
growth, but it also includes the (usually) rather irrelevant event of the replacement 
of a single employee. Discrete non-vital events may be counted and treated as 
ordinary demographic events. Continuous (non-discrete) events, such as growth 
and aging, are sometimes countable, but this usually does not capture the essence 
of the event. It is, for example, not very useful to count the number of firms that 
have grown and calculate a ‘growth rate' out of this without taking the extent of 
each individual’s growth into account. 
Continuous events (like growth) cannot be measured with standard 
demographic tools. However, as was mentioned above, any non-vital event may be 
transformed into a vital event by operationalizing the changing characteristic as a 
(sub-) population forming class. For example, growth is a typical example of a 
non-vital event. However, it is a vital event if the population the organization 
belongs to is co-defined as a size class and if the organization in question grows 
from one size class to another. This would result in an exit from the original 
population and an entry into the new population. Hence, by introducing further 
classifications or adding characteristics to the definition of a (number of) 
population (-s) non-vital events may be transformed into population transfer events 
(definition 29). However, this would result in some information loss. 
Whether an event is a vital event may depend on the type of object used for 
demographic analysis (and, hence, the type of demography). Partial relocation, for 
example, the event of a firm establishing a new division in another region, would 
not be a vital event in a demography of firms (although it could be perceived as a 
fuzzy population transfer involving decreased membership in one population and 
increased membership in a second population, in which case it would be a ‘fuzzy 
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vital event'). In a demography of local establishments, however, it could be a vital 
event, possibly even two: the founding of the new establishment and its relocation. 
In human demography important non-vital events include marriage, divorce, 
adoption, aging, etc. Except for aging, these have no counterparts in demographies 
of organizations. Although this is sometimes suggested, marriage is not at all 
similar to merger. Merger is the integration of a number of demographic objects 
(firms) into a single new object (firm). Marriage will not result in the creation of a 
new single object (person). A better analogy to marriage would be some kind of 
contract between two organizations.  
An important type of non-vital events in both human demography and 
demographies of organizations is causing an event to be experienced by another 
object (person or organization) or producing an event. This includes, for example, 
murder, but far more importantly, it also includes giving birth. In practice, birth 
rates are often measured as ‘giving birth rates’. In human demography, the number 
of births is divided by the number of fertile women to measure a birth rate. Strictly 
speaking, this is incorrect. Although the event of birth implies the event of giving 
birth and the other way around, these events do not have the same population at 
risk. In calculating a birth rate as the number of births divided by the number of 
fertile women, two different events are mixed up: the population of fertile women 
is not the population at risk of experiencing birth but of experiencing giving birth. 
In fact – dependent on the definition of t and t' – there is either no population at risk 
of experiencing birth, as those experiencing birth did not previously exist, or the 
population at risk is the population of fetuses. Hence, it is either impossible or not 
very useful to measure a birth rate. 
While confusing birth rates and ‘giving birth’ rates does not cause any 
serious problems in human demography (only twins cause a small distortion), it 
does in demographies of organizations as was shown above. Probably, the event 
most similar to birth is the introduction event (definition 14). Three subtypes of 
introduction were distinguished in figure 1, similarly, three types of causing 
introduction can be distinguished: (1) causing founding, (2) causing entry by 
(essential) change, and (3) causing entry by merger. Further types of causing entry 
are (4) causing entry by split-off and (5) causing entry by split-up. Events 2 to 5 
have similar populations at risk: subsets of the population of organizations. As 
completely new (and independent) firms (or other types of organizations) are rarely 
(if ever) founded by existing firms, the event of causing founding has a very 
different population at risk: the number of people that may found a firm (or other 
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type of organization). Hence, a rate of causing founding does not belong to the 
demography of firms, but to a demography of entrepreneurs. 
The confusion of birth rates and causing birth rates lead to the debate 
between proponents of the before mentioned labor market approach and 
organizational approach in measuring ‘birth rates’ of firms. It turns out both 
approaches are wrong. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to measure a birth rate due 
to the fact that there is no population at risk. Measuring a ‘causing birth rate' 
instead is also impossible, because this ‘supertype' event includes a number of 
different events with very different populations at risk. 
(Note that in practice, rates or similar measures are often used to calculate 
population change. In calculations like these, rates for the different entry events are 
the plusses and rates for the different exit events are the minuses. Of course, to 
make this kind of calculations possible, denominators in the rates have to be the 
same. The focus on population change suggests to use the existing population size 
at t as the denominator in these measures. In some cases, such as new founding, 
this will, however, not result in a rate in the formal sense of the word but in some 
kind of proportion.) 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In the section on ontology and conceptual analysis above, a number of 
methodological rules and requirements for ontology building were suggested. 
These included: formalization, taxonomy, extensibility, minimal ontological 
commitment, and minimal encoding bias. The ontology specified in this paper is 
explicitly formal and taxonomic. The possibility of reducing the relevant concepts 
to set-theoretical categories (sets and changes in set-membership) more or less 
solved the problem of ontological relativity and made formalization, moreover, 
relatively easy. The other three rules mentioned here are related (to each other). 
Minimal ontological commitment, like Ockham’s razor, requires definitions with a 
minimum number of variables. Five types of definitional variables were used in the 
definitions in this paper: the entities (x, y, etc.) to which the event (e) (or events) 
happened, the population (PA) (or populations) bounded by some property A (note 
that populations and properties are not logical variables) that entity is (or was) part 
of, and two points in time (t and t'). None of these can be missed. All definitions 
are written in relatively basic set-theoretical and logical notation, limiting encoding 
bias, and can be easily translated into other (formal / symbolic) languages, which 
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allows extensibility. The main limit to extensibility is that the definitions proposed 
here are ‘practically’ rather than ‘theoretically’ correct because of the definition of 
t and t' as two consecutive points of measurement. Redefining t and t' and adding 
¬∃e'[V(e',x,PA,t,t')] would make most definitions theoretically correct. (The main 
exception is definition 28 of existential change, which can never be a theoretically 
correct crisp event. Note that in case of founding (def. 16) and termination (def. 
21), ¬∃e'[V(e',x,PA,t,t')] is already part of the definition.) However, redefining t 
and t' such that these are not two consecutive points of measurement would make 
the definitions empirical useless. 
Although demographies of organizations have to deal with a higher level of 
complexity and a greater number of (possible) events than human demography, the 
actual number of different events does not seem to be as large as Carroll and 
Hannan (2000) may have feared. Only eight basic types of vital events have been 
distinguished. These are founding, termination, split-off, take-over, split-up, 
merger, essential change, and population transfer. All of these have been formally 
defined above. As population transfer is dependent on the population classification 
chosen, there are as many subtypes of population transfer as there are possible 
classifications: infinite. However, logically these are all the same type of event. 
Moreover, population transfer may (seem to) occur in combination with most of 
the other types of events. All other types of events are either supertypes and should 
be specified as the exact type of event intended or are non-vital events. Non-vital 
events can be transformed into vital events by imposing a classification based on 
the changing characteristic and treating the event as a population transfer event. 
The ontology presented in this paper is only a partial ontology. As 
mentioned, a top-level ontology of the demographies of organizations distinguishes 
events and objects. The ontology of events specified here may solve some 
theoretical problems, such as the birth-rate debate (see the preceding section), but 
to solve many of the ambiguities in these fields, an ontology of objects is needed as 
well. Moreover, objects and events are not unrelated. Whether an object 
experienced an event is partly dependent on the definition (delimitation) of that 
object (see above). The most fundamental problem in such an ontology of objects 
is that of individuality. This is the question whether organizations are discrete 
individuals (e.g. Khalil 1997). If they are not, counting them does not make sense 
and the demographies of organizations (including organizational ecology) would 
be built on quicksand. If they are, the boundaries of and between organizations 
(and the parts or divisions thereof) need analysis and definition. In conclusion and 
paraphrasing Bunge (1977, p. 23): ontology can help solve pseudo-questions that 
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arise in science and originate in misconceptions; ontology can dig up, clarify, and 
systematize basic concepts and principles occurring in the course of scientific 
research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
list of predicates 
predicate 
abbreviation short description 
definition 
CEC(e,x,PA,t,t') entry by (essential) change 28 
CEM(e,x,PA,t,t') entry by merger 24 
CES(e,x,PA,t,t') entry by split-up 23 
CXC(e,x,PA,t,t') exit by (essential) change 28 
CXM(e,x,PA,t,t') exit by merger 24 
CXS(e,x,PA,t,t') exit by split-up 23 
E(e,x,PA,t,t') entry event 13 
ED(e,x,PA,t,t') disintegration event 15 
EDS(e,x,PA,t,t') split-off event 17 
EI(e,x,PA,t,t') introduction event 14 
EIF(e,x,PA,t,t') (new) founding event 16 
individual(x) individuality n.d.  
NEX(x) non-existence 10 
NIP(x,y,PA) non-individual part of element of PA 8 
PT(x,y) part of / division of n.d.  
TE(e,x,PA,t,t') entry by population transfer 29 
TX(e,x,PA,t,t') exit by population transfer 29 
V(e,x,PA,t,t')  vital event 12 
X(e,x,PA,t,t') exit event 18 
XD(e,x,PA,t,t') dissolution event 19 
XDT(e,x,PA,t,t') termination event 21 
XI(e,x,PA,t,t') integration event 20 
XIT(e,x,PA,t,t') take-over event 22 
 
n.d. = not formally defined (in this paper) 
 
